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Abstract—The deployment of distributed energy resources,
combined with a more proactive demand side, is inducing a new
paradigm in power system operation and electricity markets.
Within a consumer-centric market framework, peer-to-peer ap-
proaches have gained substantial interest. Peer-to-peer markets
rely on multi-bilateral direct negotiation among all players to
match supply and demand, and with product differentiation.
These markets can yield a complete mapping of exchanges onto
the grid, hence allowing to rethink our approach to sharing
costs related to usage of common infrastructure and services. We
propose here to attribute such costs in a number of alternative
ways that reflects different views on usage of the grid and on
cost allocation, i.e., uniformly and based on the electrical distance
between players. Since attribution mechanisms are defined in an
exogenous manner and made transparent they eventually affect
the trades of the market participants and related grid usage. The
interest of our approach is illustrated on a test case using the
IEEE 39 bus test system, underlying the impact of attribution
mechanisms on trades and grid usage.
Index Terms—Economic dispatch, Distributed optimization,
Optimal power flow, Cost allocation, Product differentiation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed energy resources, jointly with ICT and energy
system management for residential homes and buildings, are
making us rethink our approach to power system operation.
Especially, going down to lower levels of the network, new
type of agents are appearing, namely prosumers, with the
ability to produce and consume (and most likely store in a
very near future). While substantial efforts are made to have
power system operation evolve in view of that new context,
electricity markets have not gone yet through the same process
of accommodating this new context with its challenges and
opportunities. Electricity markets are expected to go from
producer-centric to consumer-centric [1], [2], while they will
most likely include a peer-to-peer (P2P) and community-
based component [3]. A P2P market relies on multi-bilateral
direct trades among participants. Employing a P2P market
framework could yield a number of advantages, for instance
thanks to product differentiation and its consumer-centric
nature, allowing for a wealth of new business models.
Product differentiation is to be understood here as the fact
that market players can express preferences on the type and
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quality of the energy they will exchange. Such preferences
could be for local energy generation, for energy with limited
CO2 emissions, etc. However, there may be discrepancies
between market-clearing (and related dispatch) and feasible
dispatch in view of grid-related and operational constraints. In
parallel, while it appears normal to socialize grid-related costs
in the current wholesale-retail market structure, a future with
peer-to-peer exchange and preferences may allow to rethink
the way we attribute such costs. Our objective here is hence to
describe a consumer-centric market allowing to allocate grid-
related costs in an exogenous manner. The various attribution
mechanisms are to impact trades and subsequent network
usage.
The first approach to coordinated multi-lateral electricity
trades was already proposed nearly 30 years ago [4]. The
original aim was to allow for the separation of economics and
reliability of system operation, as is the case for current Eu-
ropean pool-based electricity markets. The proposal involved
an iterative process with all players proposing their trades
first, followed by the system operator to decide whether the
trades respect operational constraints, or not. This proposal
was recently revited in [5], also analysing game-theoretical
properties of the solutions obtained. In both cases, the authors
pointed at the fact that charges for network usage were not
considered. A second approach may consist in relying on op-
timal power flow (OPF) models, allowing to consider network
constraints in an endogenous manner (see e.g. [6]). While
those are traditionally solved in a centralized fashion, many
decomposition techniques were proposed to also solve them in
a distributed fashion [7]–[11]. More recently, works like that
of [12] proposed to account for network limits in the presence
of distributed renewable resources and using decentralized
consensus on a blockchain. Even though those operational
problems are increasingly considered in decentralized manner,
these do not comprise a market construct while they do not
account for how grid-related usage costs would be attributed.
We propose here an alternative to account for network con-
straints and attribution of network usage costs in a consumer-
centric framework. Contrary to the previous approaches, net-
works constraints are not enforced directly. It is rather chosen
to use incentives, in the form of network usage charges to
influence the outcome of P2P markets. The resulting P2P
market formulation comprises a simple tool for system and
market operators to limit potential detrimental effects that
might be induced by P2P markets on power networks.
The manuscript is structured as following. Firstly, a novel
P2P market formulation is proposed in Section II. It is eventu-
ally solved in a distributed manner, though enabling to account
for centrally designed market policies, e.g., in the form of
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2network usage charges. Subsequently, Section III introduces
three approaches to the design of network usage charges
to enter the P2P market negotitation mechanisms through a
generalized formulation allowing for product differentiation.
Simulation results are presented and discussed in Section IV
using a test case relying on the IEEE 39-bus system. Section
V gathers our conclusions and perspectives for further work.
II. P2P MARKET DESIGN AND CORRESPONDING
OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
A P2P market is based on a community of agents with
flexible consumption or production. Prosumers will not be
explicitly considered. Agents will either be net producers (and
gathered in a set Ωp) or net consumers (gathered in Ωc).
Emphasis is eventually placed on a deterministic clearing
mechanism for a single market time unit. It may readily
be extended to multiple time units with temporally binding
constraints, while uncertainty could also be considered in
a scenario-based stochastic optimization framework. First,
a novel distributed P2P market structure is described, then
translated into a consensus + innovation algorithm inspired
by, e.g., [9], [13].
A. Problem Formulation
We first start by formulating the complete problem with
network constraints, which we will simplify in the following.
Let us assume that each agent has a quadratic cost function,
as is common in the literature, e.g., [7], [9] for economic
dispatch and optimal power flow problems. For agent n, this
cost function reads
fn (Pn) =
1
2
an (Pn)
2
+ bnPn + cn (1)
where an, bn, cn > 0 are cost function’s parameters and Pn
is the net power production or consumption of agent n, being
positive for producers and negative for consumers.
In a classical economic dispatch problem in a market
environment the goal is to maximize social welfare as the
differential between consumer and producer loss functions,
for a total community Ω of N market players, yielding our
objective function (3a). Net powers are optimized within a
flexibility range defined by a lower Pn and an upper Pn bound,
as expressed in (3e). Considering multi-bilateral trades calls
for a split of net powers, in the manner of [13], into a set of
multiple bilateral trades Pnm. Every possible bilateral power
trades within the community can be condensed in a matrix P
such that
P =
P11 · · · P1N... . . . ...
PN1 · · · PNN
 (2)
where Pnm is equal to zero if agent m is not in agent n’s
trading partnership set ωn. Net power are then obtained by
Pn =
∑
m∈ωn Pnm. P is skew-symmetric (3b) to insure power
balance of each trade, so Pnn = 0. Its allows to potentially
differentiate prices of individual trades.
Accounting for the electrical network requires additional
constraints. First, reactive power injections Q = [Q1, · · · , QN ]
are to be within a certain range (3f). Reactive power injections
help regulating amplitudes of voltages Vi of each node i ∈ N
of the power system within regulatory bounds (3g). Power
balance at each node must be respected (3i). Finally, lines
have maximal current capacities (3h). The global endogenous
problem is as follows
min
(P,Q)
∑
n∈Ω fn (Pn) (3a)
s.t. Pnm = −Pmn (3b)
Pnm > 0 if n ∈ Ωp (3c)
Pnm 6 0 if n ∈ Ωc (3d)
Pn 6 Pn 6 Pn (3e)
Qn 6 Qn 6 Qn (3f)
Vi 6 |Vi| 6 Vi i ∈ N (3g)
|Iil| 6 Iil (i, l) ∈ L (3h)∑
n∈Ni
Pn + jQn = Vi
∑
(i,l)∈L
I∗il i ∈ N , (3i)
where Iil = YiiVi + YilVl is the current on the line from
node i to node l and Yil its admittance. A direct resolution
of this problem would constitute an endogenous approach
of grid cost allocation. However the feasibility space of this
problem is strongly non-convex, and not necessarily a single
connected space. In addition, the coupling between market and
grid constraints imply an intense involvement of the system
operator at each step of the solving algorithm.
A first simplification to dissociate the market from grid con-
siderations is to include network constraints in a regularization
function h, equal to 0 if they are respected and +∞ if they
are violated. It can be noted that in this case h depends on
real and reactive power injections. Reactive injections will be
assumed sufficient to compensate voltage drops. The focus is
then put on the real power market. In this case h only depends
on real power and can be noted h(P). The problem becomes
min
P
∑
n∈Ω
fn(Pn) + h(P) (4a)
s.t. Pnm = −Pmn (4b)
Pn 6 Pn 6 Pn (4c)
Pnm > 0 if n ∈ Ωp (4d)
Pnm 6 0 if n ∈ Ωc. (4e)
This paper aims at replacing the regularization function
to result in an exogenous approach used as a compensation
mechanism for operation costs such as maintenance, power
losses, power injection compensations, etc. Allocating these
expenses will allow the system operator to reach cost recov-
ery. Production differentiation formulation introduced in [13]
seems a good candidate for this purpose. The regularization
function evaluating network constraints can be replaced by
h(P) =
∑
n∈Ω,m∈ωn
γnmPnm + h˜(P) (5)
where parameters γnm are product differentiation prices and
h˜(P) is an additional policy. Parameter γnm is used to impact
the trade of agent n with agent m for its use of the electrical
network. This cost allocation is separable among participants,
3and will be integrated in their objective function as it will be
further discussed in section III. However, h˜(P) might not be
separable if it represent a global objective of the community.
In consequence, the resolution can be distributed but not
decentralized. The presence of the system operator in the loop
is still mandatory in such a formulation. When distributed,
at each iteration the system operator possesses a copy, noted
Z, of all power trades. This global variable can contribute to
power trades consensus. For this, reciprocity constraint (4b)
is replaced by power consensus constraint (6b). Power trades’
reciprocity is imposed by the system operator on the global
variable with Z =
(
P− PT) /2, where .T is the transpose
function. The final problem is
min
P,Z
∑
n∈Ω
[
fn(Pn) +
∑
m∈ωn γnmPnm
]
+ h˜(Z) (6a)
s.t. Pnm = Znm (6b)
Pn 6 Pn 6 Pn (6c)
Pnm > 0 if n ∈ Ωp (6d)
Pnm 6 0 if n ∈ Ωc. (6e)
For the rest of this paper no other global policies will be
considered, so h˜(Z) = 0.
B. Distributed P2P Market: Consensus + Innovations
As presented in [7], [14] several distributed or decentral-
ized algorithms are adapted to solve problem (6). As in
[9], the consensus and innovations algorithm used is based
on obtaining a distributed iterative solution of the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) first order optimality conditions of the
problem. The consensus and innovations algorithm presents
the advantage of having light updates requiring only basic
operators, which makes it adapted for small computation units
– such as for households – and rather straight forward for an
implementation.
The Lagrangian of (6) is
L(P,Z) =
∑
n∈Ω
[
fn(Pn) +
∑
m∈ωn γnmPnm−∑m∈ωn ynm(Pnm − Znm)
−µn
(
Pn − Pn
)
−µn
(
Pn − Pn
)
−∑m∈ωn (υpnm − υcnm)Pnm]
(7)
where ynm, µn, µn, υpnm, υ
c
nm are respectively the La-
grangian multipliers of power consensus, upper and lower
bounds and sign constraints (6b)-(6e). When applied to (6) the
consensus and innovations iterative process aims at reaching
a consensus on Lagrangian multipliers ynm of the power
consensus constraint (6b). Multipliers ynm are interpreted as
the prices of the commodity and are used as medium for
negotiation. For each partnership of ωn, agent n will estimate
the optimal Lagrange multiplier for this trade by following the
iterative process
yk+1nm = y
k
nm − βk(yknm − ykmn)− αk(P knm − Zknm) (8)
where αk and βk are weighing coefficients meeting the same
conditions than in [9]. These estimates are sought to meet
asymptotically through consensus. The power consensus con-
straint (6b) for this trade is sought to be verified asymptotically
too through the innovations part of the price update.
The corresponding first order KKT stationarity condition on
power trade Pnm is
f
′
n − ynm + γnm + µn − µn − υpnm + υcnm = 0, (9)
where f
′
n is the gradient of agent n’s cost function.
To converge towards this condition it is possible to consider
two steps. The first step correspond to solving the problem
without sign constraints. And the second step enforces them.
At first agent n updates its lower µnk+1 and upper µnk+1
power boundary Lagrangian multipliers such as follows
µn
k+1 =
∣∣µnk + ρk(Zkn − Pn)∣∣+ (10a)
µn
k+1 =
∣∣µnk + ρk(Pn − Zkn)∣∣+ (10b)
where ρk is a tuning parameter and | . |+ the positive part
operator. Agents update their power consumption/production
according to the new prices estimates yk+1nm and new power
boundaries Lagrangian multipliers. These updates are made
under the assumption that cost functions fn have a bijective
gradient. The asumption is valid as long as quadratic coeffi-
cients an are different from zero. In the case of a producer
power trades estimates are updated as follows
P k+1nm =
∣∣Zknm + gknm(f ′−1n (yk+1nm − γnm − µnk+1 (11)
+ µn
k+1)− Zkn
)∣∣+
where the positive part operator | . |+ enforces power trade
sign constraint. The negative part operator is used instead in
the case of a consumer. The proposed gradient step factor gknm
is as follows
gknm =
|Zknm|+ τk−δ∑
m∈ωn (|Zknm|+ τk−δ)
(12)
with τ and δ are tuning parameters.
After collecting all power trade set points, the central agent
deals with the global variable to facilitate the consensus.
Global variable’s update is as follows
Zk+1nm =
P k+1nm − P k+1mn
2
, ∀(n,m) ∈ Ω× ωn. (13)
Note that in the context of privacy it would be interesting to
use a secured mechanism, as in [12], for the global variable
update as well as prices updates.
III. EXOGENOUS GRID COST ALLOCATION
When the goal is to obtain a P2P market with allocation
of grid costs it is possible to use product differentiation as
presented in (5). It may be noted that in such case product
differentiation prices γnm would be provided by the system
operator rather than chosen by agents. A cost allocation policy
refers to the way product differentiation prices are designed
to allocate costs.
When an incident occurs on the network security dispo-
sitions are applied automatically. However, the market as
defined initially do not intrinsically take this into consid-
eration. It is possible to vary partnership sets ωn but this
4would require special signals from the system operator to
alert market participants. Product differentiation prices used
as transmission charges might offer an indirect solution to
handle deteriorated situations. Cost allocation policy could
incite agents to shift from their usual partners to others not
affected by the malfunctions without changing their routine.
The corresponding cost allocation policy would then need to
enable market islanding. This second requirement corresponds
to a security market procedure with the least grid stress while
waiting for repairing. This deteriorate mode could also be used
in case of congestion, for example by pushing consumers to
lessen their consumption.
After expressing what amount of money is collected by the
system operator, three cost allocation policies are proposed.
A. Total Fees
The money paid (resp. received) by agent n for buying
electricity from (resp. selling to) agent m is given by the
perceived price yˆnm = ynm − γnm. Product differentiation
prices are costly exogenous parameters. Hence, when agent
n is a consumer γnm is negative, so the price paid yˆnm is
higher than the electricity price ynm. For a producer the price
received is lower than the electricity price, since its parameters
γnm are positive. The total money paid or received by agent
n is expressed by
Yn =
∑
m∈ωn
yˆnmPnm. (14)
The part reserved for the system operator is
Γn =
∑
m∈ωn
γnmPnm. (15)
From the system operator’s point of view, the total amount
of money collected through product differentiation prices is
ΓSO =
∑
n∈Ω
∑
m∈ωn
γnmPnm. (16)
As mentioned previously, this money can be used to cover
operation expenses, such as maintenance, power losses, power
injection compensations, etc.
B. Unique Cost Allocation Policy
The simplest cost allocation policy is to share costs equally
between members of the community. A unique network fee
uuniq serves as an adjusting parameter for the system operator.
In this framework no discrimination is made between partic-
ipants. Because of the universality of this policy, agents in
recurrently congested areas might not be spurred to behave
in a responsible manner. In this case misbehavior of a few
agents would penalize the rest of the community. If grid costs
are equally shared between the buyer and the seller of a trade,
product differentiation prices become
γuniqnm = ±
uuniq
2
, ∀(n,m) ∈ Ω× ωn, (17)
where the sign of γuniqnm is such that γ
uniq
nmPnm > 0 to be a
costly criterion for agent n, so > 0 for producers and < 0 for
consumers. The network fee uuniq is expressed in e/MW.
C. Electrical Distance Cost Allocation Policy
To be more precise in how costs are allocated, it is possible
to make product differentiation prices proportional to the
electrical distance between agents. This cost allocation policy
would incite agents to trade with their closest electrical part-
ners. When costs are equally shared between trading partners
and follow the same sign convention than previously, product
differentiation prices become
γdistnm = ±
udistdnm
2
, ∀(n,m) ∈ Ω× ωn, (18)
where dnm is the electrical distance between agent n and agent
m and the distant network fee udist an adjusting parameter. The
network fee udist is expressed in e/MW/distance unit.
The definition of an electrical distance is a crucial issue
for this cost allocation policy. [15] recommends two electrical
distances, developed to allow a better vulnerability assessment
through a topological visualization of an electrical structure.
It is possible to consider either
1) the Thevenin Impedance Distance, where each line is
weighed by the norm of its Thevenin impedance after
which a shortest path algorithm is performed to obtain
the Thevenin electrical distance between two distant
nodes, or
2) the Power Transfer Distance, where the absolute value of
Power Transfer Distribution Factors induced by a single
trade are summed.
The Thevenin impedance distance, only considering the short-
est path, is more adapted to a radial network such as a
distribution grid. On the other hand, the power transfer dis-
tance considering a dc power flow approximation of the entire
network is better suited for a meshed network such as a
transmission grid.
D. Uniform Zonal Cost Allocation Policy
The unique cost allocation policy does not differentiate
agents while the electrical distance one might individualize
too much grid tariffs. Using a zonal cost allocation policy
seems a good compromise between both. In this situation the
electrical network would be divided in several zones assigned
with a zonal network fee uzone. These network fees serve
as adjusting parameter. Each zone could be managed by a
different system operator. Product differentiation prices are
obtained by summing zonal network fees of trade’s crossed
zones. An easy way to define trade’s crossed zones is to
use the shortest path, as for the Thevenin electrical distance.
The considered path is equivalent to the most probable or the
easiest electrical path. Applying a very high price to a zone
would incite agents not to trade with agents of this zone, and
inside agents towards self-consumption. In this sense, the cost
allocation policy allows to isolate a zone but only from the
market point of view.
This mechanism is simplified by considering zonal network
fees to be uniform. This way, the problem of how zonal
network fees are design between zones is limited. For this
uniform zonal cost allocation policy with costs shared equally
5between trading partners and with the same sign convention
than previously, product differentiation prices become
γzonenm = ±
uzoneNzonenm
2
, ∀(n,m) ∈ Ω× ωn, (19)
where Nzonenm corresponds to the number of zone crossed by the
trade. The network fee uzone is expressed in e/MW.
It may be noted that both electrical distance and zonal cost
allocation policies depend on grid characteristics, which do
not variate in time. The flexibility is given by the network
fees, adapting product differentiation prices to grid status (e.g.
between day and night).
IV. CASE-STUDIES AND APPLICATION RESULTS
In this section the effects induced by the proposed cost
allocation policies will be evaluated and compared to the
results obtained in the case of a free market, with network
fees equal to zero.
A. Test Case
To evaluate market responses flexible agents need to be
defined. In addition, to test feasibility of power commitments
grid characteristics are needed. Many standards exist for OPF
problems, such as IEEE 39 bus test system. However, these test
systems do not take into account flexible loads, neither cost
functions nor flexibility limits are defined for loads. Some test
cases exist for P2P markets, such as in [9], but they do not
take power system’s characteristics in consideration.
There is a need for a new test case adapted to the study
of P2P markets accounting for network constraints. The grid
of the IEEE 39 buses test system is considered for which
generators and loads are defines as flexible. Generators will
keep the same power boundaries. A wide flexibility range is
given to consumers, with bounds from 10% to 150% of IEEE
test system’s fixed loads. Quadratic cost function parameters,
inspired from [9], are summarized in Table I, while line
characteristics are those of the IEEE 39 buses test system. The
final power network in Fig. 1 is divided in four administrative
zones, arbitrary defined, and will be referred as the New
England test case.
For example, when the consumer at node 16 buys power
from the producer at node 39, cost allocation policies have dif-
ferent impact on product differentiation prices. Since this test
case is based on a meshed network the power transfer distance
is used. The power transfer electrical distance between node 16
and 39 is 7.3, without dimension. The Thevenin shortest path
between the same nodes passes by nodes {16, 17, 18, 3, 2, 1,
39} which crosses 2 zones. This gives a ratio 7.3 between the
electrical distance and uniform product differentiation prices.
The ratio is of 2 when zonal product differentiation prices are
compared with the unique ones.
B. Free Market
The free market refers to the P2P market when not costs are
allocated, network fees equal to zero. The free market in the
New England test case leads to a consensus equilibrium for
a free market electricity price of 58.1 e/MW. Independently
Bus 39
Bus 1 Bus 18
Bus 3
Bus 4
Bus 5
Bus 6
Bus 8
Bus 9
Bus 7
Bus 10
Bus 11
Bus 13
Bus 12
Bus 14
Bus 15
Bus 16
Bus 17
Bus 2
Bus 19
Bus 20
Bus 21
Bus 22
Bus 23
Bus 24
Bus 25
Bus 26
Bus 27
Bus 28 Bus 29
Bus 30
Bus 31 Bus 32 Bus 33Bus 34
Bus 35
Bus 36
Bus 37
Bus 38
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3 Zone 4
: Producers (agents)
: Consumers (agents)
Fig. 1: New England test case for joint P2P market and OPF
TABLE I: Agents’ characteristics of New England test case
Agent Bus an [e/MW2] bn [e/MW] Pn [MW] Pn [MW]
1 1 0.067 64 -146.4 -9.76
2 3 0.047 79 -483 -32.2
3 4 0.047 71 -750 -50.0
4 7 0.053 62 -350.7 -23.38
5 8 0.082 65 -783 -52.2
6 9 0.052 83 -9.8 -0.65
7 12 0.087 63 -12.8 -0.853
8 15 0.057 81 -480 -32.0
9 16 0.050 73 -493.5 -32.9
10 18 0.052 69 -237 -15.8
11 20 0.071 62 -1020 -68.0
12 21 0.064 79 -411 -27.4
13 23 0.057 60 -371.3 -24.75
14 24 0.082 80 -462.9 -30.86
15 25 0.069 78 -336 -22.4
16 26 0.069 70 -208.5 -13.9
17 27 0.086 62 -421.5 -28.1
18 28 0.054 70 -309 -20.6
19 29 0.078 66 -425.3 -28.35
20 31 0.081 70 -13.8 -0.92
21 39 0.059 71 -1656 -110.4
22 30 0.089 18 0 1040
23 31 0.067 21 0 646
24 32 0.055 37 0 725
25 33 0.082 25 0 652
26 34 0.088 17 0 508
27 35 0.076 38 0 687
28 36 0.084 28 0 580
29 37 0.077 36 0 564
30 38 0.051 38 0 865
31 39 0.087 19 0 1100
6Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
(a) Power trades without network fees
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
(b) Power trades for a unique network fee uuniq of 29 e/MW
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
(c) Power trades for a distance network fee udist of 10 e/MW
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
(d) Power trades for a zonal network fee uzone of 29 e/MW
Fig. 2: Influence of network fee policies on market structure (red lines: inter-zone exchanges, green lines: intra-zone exchanges)
from the power network, it is important to study interactions
between participants. This aspect will allow to verify if the
conjectures made, when cost allocation policies have been
defined, are correct. Looking at how trades are distributed
between participants and the exchanges between zones seem
also relevant. Moreover, the way the grid is used can be studied
in a second step. This will help to point the presence of
potential congestion.
To visualize resulting relations between agents it is possible
to look into graph theory visualizations such as interaction
diagrams. However, the interpretation of market interactions
with such representation might be complex. A more intuitive
visualization is to show the trades on power system’s map Fig.
1. For clarity reasons it is recommended not to show lines and
buses. Finally, to emphasize the difference between intra- and
inter-zone exchanges, they will respectively be represented by
green and red lines. To discriminate between main and small
trades lines thickness will be proportional to the power traded.
Only trades over 10−2 MW are represented in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2a shows power trade exchanges between market
participants in the free market. Most trades are inter-zone
exchanges. This implies that there is no correlation between
the market and the power network restrictions, agents do not
favor local trades. In consequence there is a high amount of
power flowing between zones. The global absolute exchanges
between zones is above 2 GW. A DC power flow analysis
shows one congested line located between node 16 and node
19, used up to 130% of its capacity. Hence the risk of
congestion does not originate from exchanges between zones.
C. Impact on Peers’ Interactions
It is then evident that no link exists between market op-
erations and grid infrastructure. Understandably, feasibility
of market outcomes is not guaranteed. Even though the
commitments were applicable, the system operator would not
be able to allocate operation costs without using product
differentiation prices. The proposed cost allocation policies
have a direct impact on relationships between community
members. The increase of network fees might incite agents
to trade less or differently.
As the unique cost allocation policy do not discriminate
trades strong interactions between zones persist with a unique
7network fee uuniq of 50% of the free market electricity price,
Fig. 2b. This policy does not encourage to adopt a cohesion
between agents of the same area. However, the level of trades
are much lower than the free market. The number of relevant
trades also suffered from an important decrease. Some of the
smallest consumers are only able to contract small power
exchanges which make them appear isolated. The presented
numerical result depends on the chosen characteristic for each
agent. However the possibility to impact the grid power flow
thank to a market fee is a general property.
With the electrical distance cost allocation policy the re-
duction of power trades level is reach much sooner. Already
for a network fee of 17% of the free market electricity price
the number of relevant trades has plummeted, Fig. 2c. This
leaves more agents with small trades which reflects the fact
that agents are at a lower level of flexibility than for the
previous unique cost allocation policy, analysis deepen in next
subsection. Power interactions has been modified to appear
grouped by area. The market appears to be more coherence
with grid infrastructures. It can be noted that only two inter-
zone trades are still over 10−2 MW.
Finally, the zonal cost allocation policy can reach the same
type of interactions with a fee of 50% of the free market
electricity price, Fig. 2d. The pressure does not reach the same
level of constraint on market’s flexibility, which is translated
by more relevant trades than in Fig. 2c. It can be noted that
the zonal cost allocation policy avoids completely inter-zone
exchanges.
To verify the conjecture that electrical distance and zonal
cost allocation policies improve the coherence between market
and network, it is possible to consider the variation of global
absolute exchanges between zones depending on network
fees, Fig. 3. The graph seems to mitigate this conjecture. As
expected the amount of power traded between zones under
a unique cost allocation policy seems to follow a linear
decrease. It reaches a lower limit when market looses its
flexibility. The lower bound being above zero indicates that the
unique cost allocation policy does not push towards zonal self-
consumption. This market configuration rather pushes agents
to self-consume. With the zonal cost allocation policy the
similar pattern is observed but with an ability to completely
annihilate trades between zones. Trend’s similarity actually
originate from the uniform definition of zonal prices. If zones
had different zonal prices, the zonal cost allocation policy
was expected to be more discriminating while conserving its
zonal islanding capability. Even though electrical distance cost
allocation policy seems to be more efficient at first, the amount
of power exchanged between zones is still important, coming
from a high number of small trades.
D. Effects on Power Network Usage
Market aggregation by zone does not reflect how the elec-
trical grid is used. Cost allocation policies not only affects, but
also provide an adjustment variable to the system operators.
Network fees enable to tweak the expected outcomes of the
P2P market in such way line capacities might not be violated
and operation costs might be recovered by the system operator.
Fig. 3: New England test case for joint P2P market and OPF
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Fig. 4: Line rates of market outputs under unique network fees
Looking at the power flows induced by power commitments
is more relevant to evaluate the efficiency of cost allocation
policies. The market does not follow any physical limitations
unlike the electrical grid, thus the difference between a feasible
and none feasible market equilibrium lies in power network’s
feasibility set. In Fig. 4 DC power flows are represented for
different unique network fees by steps of 1 e/MW. For this
market community in average lines are used way below their
capacity. However, one line is overloaded. As expected when
the network fee increases, lines usage decreases. In this case,
the most solicited line usage falls below its capacity limit. The
absolute disparity of line rates drops till market’s flexibility is
lost.
To compare the three cost allocation policies only the
average (continuous) and the maximum (dashed) line rates are
plotted in Fig. 5 (upper part). It can easily be seen that the
electrical distance cost allocation policy behaves differently
from the other two. As an indication, a zone corresponding to
the possible range of the average line rate is shown. The lower
and upper bounds are respectively defined as the average line
rate for the global minimum and maximum consumption.
Both maximum and average line rates decrease linearly with
the unique and zonal network fees. Their behavior is linear
because they are defined uniformly or uniformly over zones.
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(upper part) and total money collected for cost recovery (lower
part)
As noted in subsection IV-B the most stressed line is inside a
zone. In consequence, the zonal cost allocation policy is not
able to remedy the congestion in a better way than the unique
cost allocation. The electrical distance cost allocation policy
generates a greater impact on the market which is translated
in a faster decrease not only on the average but also on the
maximum line rate. The electrical distance cost allocation
policy allows to obtain feasibility of market commitments
with the lowest over-cost for market participants. However, the
money collected by the system operator might not be sufficient
in this case to reach cost recovery.
The lower part of Fig. 5 represents the total amount of
money collected by the system operator. From these curves
it is clearly possible to identify when the market is too
constrained. In this case, power trades stay the same while
network fee criterion continue to increase, which leads to a
linear increase. It can be observed that given market flexibility
a local maximum exists, dashed lines for the unique cost
allocation policy. The system operator can then deduce if
operation costs can be recovered for a given cost allocation
policy.
Finally, Fig. 5 offers a graphic tool for the system operator.
It can choose which network fee to apply, for a given cost
allocation policy, by following the proposed guide. For a given
maximum acceptable line rate the corresponding network fee
and the amount of money collected can be deduced. Or, for a
given amount of money to collect to recover operation costs
the corresponding network fee and maximum line rate can be
deduced.
V. CONCLUSION
Peer to peer markets are considered as a likely evolution of
the power systems driven by distributed energy resources and
ICT. In this paper a peer to peer electricity market including
product differentiation has been considered. Product differen-
tiation terms have been used as incentives to account for grid
operation costs on which the market relies on. This mech-
anism incites market participants to respect power system’s
limits rather than enforcing them. Tested on three incentive
frameworks, with a test case based on the IEEE 39 bus test
system, it has been shown the ability of this mechanism to
limit market outcomes’ stress on the physical grid. Product
differentiation terms also allow the system operator to collect
money from market participants for their use of the grid.
This exogenous approach is a candidate for an applicable
future step peer to peer market and is extendable to multiple
time step considerations. The next step towards this is to
compare the actual efficiency of this exogenous approach to
an endogenous one, which guarantees to be applicable on the
grid. If proven efficient, an online learning mechanism could
be develop to obtain incentive parameters, provided a priori,
in a robust way.
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